Abstract The US Environmental Protection Agency maintains networks of pollution monitors for two basic purposes: to check and enforce the attainment of national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) and to provide useful data for studying pollution and its effects. These purposes imply conflicting criteria for the locations of a limited number of monitors. To check the attainment of standards, monitors are placed where pollution levels are highest. Monitors are not required where standards have always been met and there are no new pollution sources. To provide useful data for studying pollution and its effects, monitors would be placed to observe outcomes under a variety of pollution levels. This study asks the following questions. What factors affect when a monitor is retired from the network? What drives the decision to add a new site? What causes year-to-year changes in the number of monitors? We tackle these questions with a particular focus on the role of regulatory compliance and pollution levels in the context of monitors for tropospheric ozone (O 3 ). Using a panel dataset of monitors in the contiguous US spanning the years 1993 to 2011, we find that the peak O 3 readings in the prior period are significantly associated with the regulator's decision of whether to add or to drop a monitor in the following period. While compliance with the NAAQS for O 3 is not consistently associated with network composition, compliance with the PM 2.5 NAAQS does appear to affect changes to the network.
Introduction
The US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) maintains networks of pollution monitors for two basic purposes: to check and enforce the attainment of national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) and to provide useful data for studying pollution and its effects (40 C.F.R. § 58, Appendix D). These purposes imply conflicting criteria for the locations of a limited number of monitors. To check the attainment of standards, monitors are placed where pollution levels are highest. Monitors are not required where standards have always been met and there are no new pollution sources. To provide useful data for studying pollution and its effects, monitors are placed to observe outcomes under a variety of pollution levels, not just the highest.
Even for research into national public welfare, conflicts about monitor placement arise. Often, different research questions suggest different placement designs. Exploring the transport of pollution requires a geographical distribution of monitor sites whereas measuring the health effects of pollution is best served by wide distributions of pollution levels and socioeconomic conditions across sites. Studying the welfare effects of pollution for American residents implies a monitoring network that provides a representative view of the experiences across that population, a requirement recognized by the USEPA.
Federal regulations that govern the monitoring networks reflect both purposes, monitoring standards and studying the effects of pollution. In this paper, we make an initial systematic assessment of the relative importance of the regulations and the potential for biased sampling that may undermine the study of national public welfare.
In order to explore the factors that affect the spatial composition of the monitoring networks, this paper uses observations on tropospheric ozone (O 3 ) in the contiguous US between 1993 and 2011 gathered by the USEPA's Aeromatic Information Retrieval System (AIRS). 1 Over this time period, the number of monitoring stations in the USA has increased from approximately 900 in 1993 to about 1200 in 2011.
We focus on the ozone-monitoring network, providing a new view of the network that has produced data supporting the USEPA review.
That is, this paper explores the regulators' decision-making process for locating air pollution monitors. What factors affect when a monitor is retired from the network? What drives the decision to add a new site? What causes year-to-year changes in the number of monitors? We tackle these questions with a particular focus on the relationship between regulatory compliance, pollution levels, and network design.
We find, as expected, that monitor counts are higher in areas with high maximum O 3 readings. Moreover, the regulator is less likely to drop an existing monitor and more likely to add a new monitor to counties for which prior maximum readings are high. However, the propensity to add a new monitor is not affected by O 3 levels or attainment status in counties that dropped a monitor during the prior period; it is in counties that did not drop a monitor during the prior period and are managed by a State Implementation Plan (SIP) where high O 3 levels predict monitor additions. Analogous counties managed by a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP), however, are sensitive to attainment status rather than O 3 levels. Otherwise, evidence of an association between adding a new monitor and prior O 3 attainment status is mixed.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives background on current monitoring policy and the literature on monitoring networks. Section 3 presents the empirical results, and section 4 concludes.
Background

Policy
O 3 is a criteria pollutant regulated by the USEPA. This pollutant is associated with a variety of respiratory illnesses and, in more recent studies, has been associated with premature mortality [5, 8] . O 3 also affects timber yields and crop production [10] . These myriad effects drive the determination of the NAAQS for O 3 which were first set in 1979. The standard was set at that time to be 120 ppb for the maximum hourly concentration over the course of a year. This approach was held until 1997 when the standard was reduced to 80 ppb for the fourth highest daily maximum concentration averaged over 3 years. This standard was modified slightly to 75 ppb in 2008. 2 As stipulated by the Clean Air Act (CAA), the USEPA recently reviewed the NAAQS for ozone set in 2008. The standard was reduced again to 70 ppb. This new standard was motivated, in part, by additional evidence on the human health effects of ozone exposure.
The USEPA's ambient air quality monitoring network has many components. The principle ozone-monitoring network is the State and Local Air Monitoring Stations (SLAMS). Within SLAMS, Photochemical Assessment Monitoring Stations (PAMS) measure ozone and its precursors specifically for areas of acute non-attainment. Since 2011, the USEPA also has used the Clean Air Status and Trends Network (CASTNET), which focuses on rural areas. Finally, Special Purpose Monitoring Stations (SPMS) provide ozone measurements from about 20 rural monitors that are part of the Portable O 3 Monitoring System (POMS) network operated by the National Park Service (NPS).
Each state or local network in SLAMS must include a monitor site for one of six roles, all related to ozone. Three roles concern monitoring various pollution levels: (1) peak air pollution levels within the area covered by the network, (2) typical levels in densely populated areas, and (3) background concentration levels. A fourth role is to measure the impact of particular significant sources of pollution. Observing regional movement of air pollution between populated areas is the fifth role. Finally, monitors are dedicated to measuring pollution effects on visibility, vegetation damage, or other welfarebased impacts. SLAMS ozone monitors generally collect data exclusively on ozone. The regulations suggest no necessary interaction between siting ozone monitors and monitors for other pollutants.
Generally, monitor number and locations are proposed by state or local authorities and submitted to the USEPA, as part of the SIP required of all states. In practice, these groups work together to develop each monitoring network. The USEPA also provides technical guidance documents on ozone monitoring network design for evaluating the adequacy of each existing monitor, to relocate or retire an existing site, or to locate any new sites.
The regulations also address modification of existing monitoring networks (40 C.F.R. § 58.14). Generally, monitors required by an attainment or maintenance plan may not be altered. Discontinuation of a monitor is permitted when it Bhas shown attainment during the previous five years [and] … has a probability of less than 10 percent of exceeding 80 percent of the applicable NAAQS during the next three years based on the levels, trends, and variability observed in the past.^Also, a monitor that Bhas consistently measured lower concentrations than another monitor for the same pollutant in the same [region] … during the previous five years^may be retired. Another monitor may replace a monitor that Bis designed to measure concentrations upwind of an urban area for purposes of characterizing transport into the area^for the same purpose (40 C.F.R. § 58.14).
In 1993, the USEPA began requiring PAMS sites in each ozone non-attainment area classified as serious, severe, or extreme. In 2006, new requirements dropped several siting specifications and required only two monitoring sites for each so-called PAMS area. The USEPA is currently considering additional changes to the requirements in order to give monitoring agencies more flexibility to pursue local objectives and to provide wider spatial distribution for research purposes. The PAMS network currently covers 25 areas with 75 sites. These sites are concentrated in California, Texas, and the northeastern seaboard.
The CASTNET was established under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. CASTNET was created to observe longterm trends in regional atmospheric sulfur, nitrogen, and ozone concentrations and deposition of sulfur and nitrogen pollutants in rural areas. In 2011, the USEPA put into operation a new National Core (NCore) network of monitors where multiple pollutants are measured. This network does not affect this study but we mention it for two reasons. First, the USEPA is considering requiring PAMS measurements at all NCore sites. This is one proposal of several addressing the desire to give PAMS wider spatial distribution for research purposes. Second, the sites are chosen to be Brepresentative^of a broad range of rural and urban sites, as opposed to focused in areas with high ambient pollution concentrations. Thus, the USEPA has acknowledged the unrepresentative nature of its SLAMS network.
The two basic purposes of the USEPA monitoring network, to check and enforce the attainment of NAAQS and to provide useful data for studying pollution and its effects, represent a range of specific uses that are best served by different network designs. The purpose of this study is to estimate the relative importance of these two purposes and to serve as a first step in assessing inference problems that arise as a result. Two basic issues for any use are whether the monitor network data are representative and whether they are informative.
Representative Monitoring
The USEPA seeks to identify non-attainment of NAAQS wherever it occurs throughout the USA. To this end, monitors are maintained where non-attainment has occurred in the past and in locations where non-attainment is probable. At the same time, the USEPA wants to know the health effects of various pollution concentrations and to inform members of the general population about the pollution levels they face. Health effects are critical inputs to the choice of design values and their associated ambient standards. Providing accurate information to the public Bsufficient to effectively participate in managing human health and environmental risks^ [23] is one of the basic missions of the USEPA. If the USEPA monitor network focuses on monitoring high pollution areas where nonattainment occurs or is probable, then there is a risk that the USEPA cannot fulfill its mission.
Because monitors cannot be placed everywhere, the monitoring network must be used to predict (or forecast) criteria pollutant levels where there are no monitors. This is the fundamental motivation for representative monitoring. By monitoring a site that is typical of other, unmonitored locations, the USEPA could infer the conditions in those unmonitored areas, albeit with some uncertainty. Matters are, of course, more complicated because sites do not fall into a few types. Inference about unmonitored conditions requires extrapolation based on conditional probability models and estimation of model parameters. If the conditions of a conditional probability model characterize an informative distribution of pollution everywhere in the nation, then accurate information can be provided to public.
Usually, estimation rests on data collection, or sampling, that is also representative in the same conditional sense as the conditional probability model. Focusing monitors on high pollution areas results in two weaknesses related to conditioning. The first is that the variation in conditions may be too narrow to project accurately in other areas with markedly different conditions. We will discuss this weakness more in the next section on informative data. The second, more fundamental, weakness arises from the restriction that a probability model for pollution levels in all areas does not condition on pollution levels. Focusing on high pollution levels is an example of sampling conditional on pollution levels. From the perspective of statistical inference, the data from such sampling are unrepresentative or biased. Statistical inference that ignores this bias may be misleading.
For example, the USEPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards manages a program called AirNow that is the USEPA's primary means of informing the public about air quality. AirNow is the national repository of real-time airquality data and forecasts for the USA based on measurements from the ambient air monitoring networks. One of our longterm goals is to assess the potential biases that the current monitor network could have on AirNow forecasts. This paper takes a first step toward that goal by investigating sampling biases.
Another important use of the air quality monitoring data is research evaluating the effects of pollution on human health. Health is influenced not only by pollution but also by other environmental factors such as population density and socioeconomic characteristics. Sampling bias can confound these determinants of health. Researchers may then mistakenly attribute the effects of other factors to pollution exposure.
Note that sampling biases do not necessarily lead to misleading inference. Statistical inference may be able to account for sampling biases and avoid deception. In some cases, sampling bias may be present but inconsequential to inference.
Informative Monitoring
A second issue for monitor networks is how informative they are. Monitor placement affects the ability to measure the effects of such influences as pollution on health accurately. Even though it is unbiased, a measure may be ambiguous because a large amount of statistical uncertainty is present. If, for example, pollution concentration is similar over the monitor network, then the influence of changes in concentration on health will be estimated imprecisely. Hence, inferences will be uncertain.
In addition, monitor placement affects the degree of detail in the observed variation of pollution across regions. When neighboring monitors in a network produce highly correlated measurements, then several monitors are measuring essentially the same process. 3 In such a case, one monitor can accurately forecast the conditions at the others. Alternatively, monitors might be placed so that they pick up the idiosyncrasies of each site so that their measurements are not highly correlated and forecasts based upon other monitors are inaccurate.
The USEPA and federal regulations have expressed attention to both aspects of creating an informative monitoring network. Required specifications for the roles of monitors ensure, in part, that monitors are not redundant. Remarks about representativeness also suggest the desire to obtain a wide variety of observed pollution levels for research on human health, ecological health, public welfare, and pollution transport. Specifically, data gathered at monitoring stations are used to assess the impact of exposure to air pollutants on a number of sensitive receptors: people, crops, timber, and ecosystems, to name a few. This phenomenon has broad importance in that Title I of the Clean Air Act (CAA) uses such scientific criteria-relationships between exposure and impact-to set the NAAQS. These standards are ostensibly set to protect human health and welfare with an adequate margin of safety. However, if collectively our sense of the threat that such pollutants pose to human health is derived from a biased set of observations, then it is certainly possible, if not probable, that the NAAQS embody this bias.
Second, air quality models are tools used to estimate the link between emissions and concentrations. A critical role played by air quality models is the ability to estimate concentrations in areas without monitors. Importantly, these models are often calibrated to the monitor readings. 4 And if the set of observations is in some way biased, then the Bcorrectionâ pplied to the air quality models may not be appropriate.
That is, the post-calibration estimates in locations without monitors will then embody the bias embedded in the monitor readings. Further, model projections in areas without monitors are used in part to inform new monitor placement decisions.
Again, if the model is calibrated to a selected sample of monitors, then the estimates that are used to inform changes to network design are likely to be biased and future network design and arrangement are also likely to reflect this bias.
Literature
To the authors' knowledge, no papers in economics directly tackle the issue of pollution monitoring network design from the perspective of regulator choice. The fields of atmospheric chemistry and physics have been applied specifically to the design of air pollution monitoring networks. The World Health Organization outlined a list of nine objectives for the design of pollution monitoring networks [25] . This broad list includes the following: the ability to evaluate health and environmental risk, evaluation of control strategies, and calibrating air quality models, among others. Only one objective appears to relate strictly to measurement without a direct connection to regulatory compliance: assessing spatial and time series trends in pollution levels. However, later papers focus on relatively few objectives in network design including the following: (1) maximization of the detection capability of peak pollution concentrations and (2) maximizing the detection capability of regulatory violations [6] . Liu et al. [11] state that early network composition was based on BSubjective considerations; semiquantitative rules supported by experience; or sometimes, limited use of analytic tools like simple Gaussian Plume models.F urther, Liu et al. [11] note that factors such as convenience in accessing monitoring stations also play an important role in siting monitors. And, as in Chang and Tseng [6] , placing monitors to capture peak readings and regulatory violations appears to be the overarching objective. The problem, as Liu et al. [11] note, is that optimization with respect to this goal requires some prior knowledge of the underlying spatiotemporal distribution of pollution. This can only come from two places: existing monitors or air quality models that are used to estimate levels. Because air quality models are calibrated to, or validated against, readings from monitors, network design clearly depends on existing information about pollution levels.
An additional objective in network design is to minimize the number of distinct monitoring stations [24] . Liu et al. [11] propose the Bsphere of influence^(SOI) approach that explores spatial correlations in predictions made by air quality models. This method proposes a new monitor site wherever the correlation between the readings at an existing station falls below a predetermined threshold value in a spatial correlation index.
Baldauf et al. [3] offer a different objective, focusing on exposure analysis. This approach optimizes network design with respect to identification of impacts on human health. Potential monitoring locations are prioritized based on likely health risks to proximal populations. Baldauf et al. [3] describe a three-part optimization strategy in which concentration, toxicity, and population density are used to identify differing levels of risk. The highest priority is given to potential locations with the highest risk. Like earlier papers, this approach is motivated by regulatory considerations, 5 not objective measurement of the pollution surface. Baldauf et al. [4] explicitly state that BMonitoring sites should be established at locations with the highest health risks to maximize the potential of obtaining a representative air quality measurement at the location(s) where adverse health effects occur.^However, selection of sites based on uncovering the highest health risks will not yield an unbiased sample of air pollution measurements for the entire area to be monitored.
Kainuma et al. [9] develop a multi-attribute strategy to rank potential monitoring sites. The attributes include factors such as effectiveness in providing readings on mean and episodic pollution levels, costs of building and maintaining the station, and population density. Kainuma et al. [9] interview air quality regulators to observe their preferences over citing attributes. They find that air quality officers prefer networks with wide coverage, coverage of highly polluted areas, and fewer stations.
Empirical Results
The analysis of this paper focuses on the revealed determinants of regulators' monitor placements to measure ambient O 3 pollution. After describing our data, we present statistical analyses of the number of monitors in a region and the removal and addition of monitors to the USEPA network.
Data
The O 3 readings used in this analysis are publicly available from the USEPA's AIRS databases (USEPA [21] ). The data are composed of hourly observations from individual monitoring stations over the period 1993 to 2011. The USEPA AIRS publishes extensive documentation on the monitors including reasons for missing observations, ownership or management of monitors, land use, and starting and ending date of service. 6 The average O 3 reading across all sites in the panel is 33.5 ppb with a standard deviation of 7.64. The average maximum hourly reading is 103.1 ppb with a standard deviation of 22.6. Roughly 3% of the data are missing observations. Nearly all of these are due to monitor malfunctions or maintenance. Approximately two thirds of the monitors are operated by state regulatory agencies, 11% are managed by county agencies, and 1% is operated by a private firm. Less than 1% is operated by the (federal) USEPA. Monitors for O 3 have been in use for an average of 15 years. The oldest monitor has been in use for 51 years. Table 1 shows the differences in various O 3 measures according to whether a site is dropped or retained in the network or if a new site is added. The 1-year lagged mean O 3 level is approximately constant for all sites. However, the hourly maximum reading is significantly lower at sites that are dropped than at retained sites, 99 versus 103 ppb. Because the O 3 NAAQS are set according to the hourly maximum values, it makes sense that sites with higher maximum values are retained in the network; they are likely to be in counties that are at least at risk of being out of attainment the following period. Hence, such sites are important for compliance assessments.
The standard deviation measure is also significantly lower in sites dropped from the network than for retained sites, 17.6 versus 18.2 ppb. Monitors with greater variability are likely to have higher peak readings than sites with lower standard deviations, so that NAAQS violations are more apt to occur. More variable monitors are also likely to be in counties at risk of non-attainment. Hence, such monitors tend to be retained.
The right-hand panel of Table 1 displays the same crosstabulations for new and existing monitors. The measurements in this case are 1-year lagged county averages. The mean O 3 level is marginally greater at new sites than at existing sites. The difference in the maximum hourly readings is about 5 ppb. The standard deviation shows a small, weakly 5 Baldauf et al. [4] note that the primary objective of the NAAQS is the protection of human health. Hence, a methodology focusing on, effectively, a ranking of sites by health risks is still motivated by regulatory concerns, rather than purely measurement. 6 See http://www.epa.gov/ttn/airs/airsaqs/manuals/codedescs.htm. statistically significant difference. The right-hand panel of Table 1 suggests that O 3 monitors are placed in locations with higher mean O 3 levels, higher peak readings, and greater standard deviations. Thus, Table 1 provides crude evidence that changes to the monitor network are associated with differences in O 3 levels.
Monitor Count
Our analysis begins by examining factors that determine the number of monitors in various locations across the country. We begin by fitting cross sections; in each cross-section t (from 1994 to 2010), we explain the number of monitors within a specified radius r of each monitor i. In our baseline specification, the monitor count is explained by lagged ambient O 3 readings, the age of the monitoring station, location (latitude and longitude), the fraction and causes of missing observations at site i, and the population in the county where monitor i is located. The reasons for missing data include maintenance, malfunction, damage, weather, and an anomaly. The counts are explained using Poisson regression and negative binomial regression. 7 The default radius is 50 miles, and this measure is altered in a sensitivity analysis.
In these count models, we employ three different measurements of ambient O 3 readings. The first is the O 3 seasonal mean, an average across monitoring stations in the county and over all past years in the sample. The lag structure here is important because there is considerable inertia in network design. Past ambient concentrations affect the current composition of the network because it consists of installations that last many years.
The second measurement is the O 3 standard deviation across monitoring stations in a given county, with the same lag structure as above. And the third is the maximum hourly O 3 level, across monitoring stations in a given county and all previous years in the sample. We explore these different
To our baseline model, we added sets of additional explanatory variables to explore the robustness of our estimates. First, we added controls for county-level attainment status with the O 3 NAAQS and the PM 2.5 NAAQS. While this analysis focuses on O 3 , we include PM 2.5 attainment status because some air pollution monitoring stations gather data on multiple pollutants. We use two different measures of attainment. The first measure of attainment is the sum of years, prior to t, in which a given county has been out of attainment with the current NAAQS. The measure is computed separately for both O 3 and PM 2.5 . The second measure is a dummy variable that assumes a value of unity if the monitor is in a county that was partially out of attainment in the prior period, and it assumes a value of two if the entire county was out of attainment in the prior period. 8 In our second addition to the baseline model, we also control for Bownership^of the monitors. These explanatory variables are a group of dummy variables that code whether each monitor is managed by federal, state, or county regulators, or if the stations are managed by a private firm.
Our third and final addition is a set of controls for changes to the NAAQS: the 1997 O 3 NAAQS revision and the 1997 and the 2006 PM 2.5 NAAQS revisions. These are dummy variables that assume a value of unity after the regulatory change.
Our final step in modeling the distribution of monitoring stations across the country is to control for spatial fixed effects. All of the specifications are estimated by assembling each of the cross sections into a 17-year panel, controlling for monitor fixed effects and the full set of dummy variables for year. Figure 1 plots the parameter estimates corresponding to maximum O 3 readings from the cross-sectional regressions. The results correspond to including all of the explanatory 7 We computed goodness-of-fit tests for these parametric models using the approach described in Andrews [2] . Despite fitting the data reasonably well, these tests reject the parametric models because the sample sizes are quite large. Given the qualitative agreement among our parametric models, we remain confident that the parameter estimates give an accurate representation of the patterns in the data. 8 This is how attainment status is coded by the USEPA (see: http://www.epa. gov/oaqps001/greenbk/data_download.html) 
Decision to Drop Monitors
The next step in our empirical analysis uses a probit model to test whether O 3 levels and regulatory status affects the regulator's decision to remove a monitor from the network. The dependent variable indicates whether a monitor i is dropped from the network at time t. Our baseline estimates include the same explanatory variables as our baseline analysis of counts.
We augment the list of explanatory variables to examine estimator sensitivity. Again, following the scheme for counts, we first add controls for county-level attainment status with the O 3 and PM 2.5 NAAQS. Then, we also include indicator variables for the major regulatory changes: the 1997 O 3 NAAQS revision and the 1997 and the 2006 PM 2.5 NAAQS revisions. Finally, we control for ownership or management agency of the monitors and SIP status; states are coded 1 if they are governed by an approved state SIP and 0 if they are governed by a FIP. Robust standard errors appear in parenthesis (except for negative binomial models). Specifications include sitefixed effects; first-differences employ county-fixed effects. The sample contains 24,460 observations *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 statistical significance levels Table 3 displays the results. Dropped monitors are associated with lower peak O 3 levels in each of the four model specifications. For each model, a 1-U increase in the maximum hourly O 3 reading is associated with roughly a 0.03% decrease in the probability of the monitor being dropped in the next period. The associations are significant at the 1% significance level. This result is consistent with the cross-tabulations reported in Table 1 .
Using the cumulative measure of attainment status (sum of prior years out of attainment) with the O 3 NAAQS, we find evidence of an association between attainment status and whether a monitor is dropped from the network. In all fits, cumulative non-attainment is associated with a reduction in the probability of a monitor being dropped. The estimated coefficient has the same order of magnitude in the fit which adds SIP status, but it is not statistically significant. In contrast, a 1-year increase in the number of periods out of attainment with the PM 2.5 NAAQS is associated with a 0.03% increase in the probability of a monitor being dropped.
The passage and enactment of the 1997 O 3 NAAQS increase the probability that monitors are dropped from the network. Monitors are about 1.2% more likely to be dropped from the network after the 1997 NAAQS (α = 0.05). Passage of the second PM 2.5 NAAQS revision is associated with a 0.8% increase in the probability of a monitor being dropped from the network. Counties in states that manage attainment with an SIP are about 7% more likely to have a monitor dropped than FIP states. Several other factors are significantly associated with dropping a monitor. As the average age of a monitor increases, the likelihood of a monitor being dropped decreases up to approximately 20 years; beyond 20 years, increasing age of monitors increases the chance that a monitor will be dropped from the network. Of the four different reasons for missing observations, malfunction and maintenance are consistently significantly associated with dropping a monitor. A greater share of missing observations due to monitor malfunction is positively and significantly associated with the monitor being dropped (α = 0.01) in all four models. Specifically, a 1% point increase in the share of observations missing due to malfunction results in roughly a 10% increase in the probability of the monitor being dropped. Missing observations due to maintenance are also positively associated with a monitor being dropped in all four models (α = 0.01); a 1% point increase in the share of observations missing due to maintenance results in roughly a 13% increase in the probability of the monitor being dropped.
In terms of ownership of the monitoring stations, counties with a higher share of monitors operated by county regulators are 5.5% more likely to add an additional monitor than other counties with monitors run by other local regulators. Table 3 indicates evidence of a slight, downward yearly trend with the probability of adding a monitor dropping by 0.2 to 0.3% per year (α = 0.01). The number of monitors in a county (not shown in Table 3 ), the average age of monitors, and the population are also positively and significantly associated with the probability of adding a monitor to the network.
Decision to Add Monitors
We approach the specification of models that describe the decision to add a station to the monitor network in a similar manner to the models focusing on dropped monitors. There are, however, two important differences. First, because a new monitor does not have a history, the explanatory variables measure characteristics of the county where an addition occurs. In most cases, monitors are added to counties that already have at least one monitoring station and we use county averages so that the baseline specification includes county averages of O 3 measures, fractions of missing observations, monitor age, and location. Population of a county, obviously, does not require averaging. In addition, we add a control for whether a monitor was dropped from the county in the prior period. Our motivation is to try to distinguish between new monitors that replace a monitor that was eliminated versus a new monitor that was added to the network. Table 4 displays the results. Counties that had a monitor dropped from the network in the prior period are 12% more likely to have a monitor added than counties without a dropped monitor in the prior period. Table 4 also indicates that maximum hourly O 3 readings are positively associated with the addition of a new monitor. That is, the average maximum reading (across existing monitors in a given county) during the prior year is associated with an increase in the probability of about 0.04% of a new monitor being located in that county. The average O 3 level is associated with a 0.04-0.07% increase in the likelihood of adding a new monitor, although the lower estimates have relatively large standard errors. In addition, the standard deviation of O 3 readings is associated with a decrease in the probability of a new monitor being located in a county of between 0.16 and 0.27%.
A 1-U increase in O 3 NAAQS attainment status is associated with an increase of 0.04% in the probability of a new monitor being added to the network. On the other hand, attainment status with the PM 2.5 NAAQS is not associated with the probability of adding a new monitor. There is no evidence that the passage of the NAAQS revisions impact the decision to add a new monitor to the network. If a state employs a SIP to manage NAAQS compliance, the likelihood of adding a new station to the network increases by about 2% (α = 0.01) relative to a state subject to direct federal management under an FIP. Having a monitor dropped from the network in the same county (1 year earlier) increases the probability of adding a monitor by 12%.
New Monitors and SIP, Drop Status
Whether to replace a monitor that has mechanically failed or has been permanently removed from the network for some other reason is a distinct question from whether to add a new monitor to the network in order to obtain observations in areas not previously subject to measurement. In order to examine both of these questions, Table 5 reports results from fits with the complete set of explanatory variables applied to two restricted samples.
First, Table 5 reports results for counties that did not have a monitor dropped in the prior period. Second, Table 5 reports results for counties that did have a monitor dropped in the prior period. Table 5 also differentiates between states that implement approved SIPs from states that are subject to FIPs. SIP states may face different incentives than FIP states that are related to regulatory enforcement and may have a direct bearing on network composition.
The top panel of Table 5 shows the results when the sample is restricted to counties in which a monitor was not dropped in the prior period. These cases constitute net additions to the network. The first (left hand) column indicates that the marginal effects of O 3 readings (maximums, means, and standard deviation) are roughly equivalent to those reported for the last column of Table 4 with the exception of weak evidence that average O 3 levels affect the propensity to add a monitor (α = 0.10). The average maximum reading (across existing monitors in a given county) during the prior year is associated with an increase in the probability of a new monitor being located in that county of 0.05% (α = 0.10). The O 3 standard deviation is negatively associated with the installation of a new monitor (α = 0.01). These marginal effects are relatively unchanged for SIP states. They are even larger for FIP states but the estimate is imprecise. We detect weak evidence that O 3 standard deviations are associated with a decrease in the likelihood of adding a monitor (α = 0.10) in FIP states. Table 5 also shows the association between the attainment status and the probability of adding a new monitor. As in Table 4 , O 3 NAAQS attainment status shows a significant association with the probability of adding a monitor across Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. All models contain controls for monitor latitude, longitude (linear and quadratic forms). The sample contains 24,996 observations. Marginal effects are reported *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 significance levels all states. When the sample is restricted to just SIP states, the evidence is ambiguous. In contrast, for states subject to a FIP, there is strong evidence of a positive, significant association: being out of attainment in a state subject to direct federal management (as implied by the FIP) increases the probability of adding a new monitor by 0.11%. For counties without a dropped monitor, O 3 NAAQS attainment status appears to be a factor in determining whether a new monitor is added to the existing network in states that are subject to a FIP. Attainment status seems to have little impact on new monitors in states governed by their own SIP. The findings in the top panel of Table 5 suggest different regulatory strategies in FIP and SIP states. Since SIPs and FIPs specify, in part, strategies for monitoring O 3 , the fact that O 3 readings are only significant in the SIP sample suggests that state-level regulators incorporate information on pollution levels into network composition while federal regulators do not. In contrast, federal regulators make additions to the Table 5 reports weak evidence of an association with the decision to add a monitor in all states and in FIP states. In all states, the effect on a 1-year increase in years out of attainment is a 1.9% increase in the likelihood of adding a monitor (α = 0.10). In FIP states, the effect on a 1-year increase in years out of attainment is a 4.3% increase in the likelihood of adding a monitor (α = 0.10). In counties that did not drop a monitor in the prior period, attainment status has less impact on new monitors in states governed by their own SIP. Further, we find no evidence that O 3 NAAQS revisions affect new monitor placement.
The bottom panel of Table 5 focuses on counties in which a monitor was dropped in the prior period. In all states, O 3 peak readings reduce the likelihood of adding a monitor (replacing a dropped monitor). Specifically, a 1-U increase in O 3 maximum readings reduces the probability of replacing a dropped monitor by 1.9% (α = 0.01). This effect is driven by SIP states. That is, the association is also detected in only SIP states and there is no evidence of an association for FIP states. In addition, there is little evidence that O 3 NAAQS attainment status is associated with the likelihood of adding a monitor to the network in counties where a monitor was dropped in the prior period. Table 6 explores the sensitivity of the estimates for adding monitors to the inclusion of observations for monitors that are added to the network in counties that do not have a monitor in the prior period. In every case, the reported coefficients are estimated with the complete set of explanatory variables, which includes controls for O 3 readings, missing observations, and monitor ownership.
The difficulty these additional observations pose is that none of the lagged measures of O 3 levels can be included. However, using USEPA estimates of attainment status for all counties in the USA, we can fit a model with reasonable explanatory power to the larger sample of new monitors. Column 1, Bno new counties,^reports the results of fitting the full model to the original sample for comparison with the spatially extended sample. In the original sample, only O 3 attainment status and the SIP indicator are associated with the probability of adding a new monitor. Including previously unmonitored counties into the sample produces some significant, and different, associations.
First, when the new monitors in previously unmonitored counties are added, O 3 attainment status is negatively associated with the likelihood of adding a new monitor; a 1-U increase in the years of non-attainment status is associated with a 0.1% decrease in the likelihood of adding a monitor. This is greater than a twofold increase in the marginal effects relative to the default specification. Further, SIP states are much more likely to add a monitor. The second PM 2.5 NAAQS revision is also associated with a 3% increase in probability of adding a monitor. The third and fourth columns restrict the larger sample to SIP and FIP states. The results for both mirror those of the full sample.
That prior O 3 non-attainment is inversely related to the decision to add a monitor when the sample includes previously unmonitored counties is consistent with regulators who are In contrast, when the sample is restricted to counties previously monitored, regulators appear to target additional monitors in problematic (chronically out-of-attainment) counties. Regulators may choose to add monitors to non-attainment counties to try to lower the average reading in that county (in an attempt to improve future attainment status). This might be achieved by strategically placing the monitor in cleaner zones within the county. Alternatively, recall from Table 5 that the positive association between O 3 attainment status and propensity to add a monitor is strongest in FIP states. Since these states are directly managed by federal regulators, this positive association may be intended to increase precision of O 3 measurements by adding more observations (new monitors). These findings provide evidence of a complex relationship between NAAQS attainment status and network composition that depends on SIP/FIP status.
Conclusions
In the USA, air pollution monitors are used to assess environmental conditions and for purposes of regulatory enforcement. If the primary objective of measurement was to derive an unbiased estimate of the O 3 surface, the approach would be to place the monitors exogenously with respect to observed levels and to allocate monitors more densely where the surface variation is greatest. However, because the monitors are used for enforcement, the monitors are not randomly placed. The stations tend to be in areas where compliance with existing standards and rules is in question. The goal of this paper is to test whether monitor location is endogenous with respect to ambient pollution levels and regulatory compliance status. A secondary goal is to describe the factors that systematically affect the monitor network.
The empirical results of the paper can be boiled down to four essential points. First, monitor counts are higher in areas with high maximum O 3 readings. Second, the regulator is less likely to drop an existing monitor for which prior maximum readings are high. Third, the regulator is more likely to add a new monitor to counties for which prior maximum readings are high. Fourth, evidence of an association between prior O 3 attainment statuses is mixed. Regulators appear more likely to add monitors to counties with a legacy of non-attainment, particularly in FIP states. However, regulators in states managed by a SIP are less likely to add a monitor to previously unmonitored counties that are chronically out of attainment. Whether a state manages its own compliance strategies or whether this role is assumed by the federal government is a significant factor in determining whether lagged compliance status affects changes to the monitoring network.
This analysis suggests future research on a number of fronts. First, further work could apply this apparatus to other pollutants. Do these results found herein hold for PM 2.5 monitoring stations or for sulfur dioxide? Second, research could test for selection bias in the O 3 surface resulting from the endogenous placement of monitors. This might explore whether selection, and the mechanisms driving selection, changed over time and to what extent regulatory constraints affect estimates of such bias. Third, one could explore the removal of selection bias from the O 3 surface and test whether this impacts our understanding of how O 3 affects health and other valuable receptors such as crops and trees.
